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Kierkegaard on the Structure of Selfhood
by MARK C. TAYLOR
In this essay, we shall try to arrive at a satisfactory interpretation of Kierke­
gaard’s very complex view of the structure of selfhood by analyzing his 
arguments as expressed primarily in The Sickness Unto Death and The 
Concept of Dread. It will be maintained that Kierkegaard’s conception of 
selfhood can be more adequately grasped by placing is his discussion within its 
historical context. As will become evident, the task of understanding this 
issue is complicated considerably by Kierkegaard’s tendency to use different 
categories interchangeably, and by his persistent use of philosophical terms to 
which he gives meanings different from those traditionally associated with 
them.
1. The Problem
Kierkegaard opens The Sickness Unto Death with his most complete, and 
his most perplexing, definition of the structure of selfhood.
Mennesket er Aand. Men hvad er Aand? Aand er Selvet. Men hvad er 
Selvet? Selvet er et Forhold, der forholder sig til sig selv, eller er det i For 
holdet, at Forholdet forholder sig til sig selv; Selvet er ikke Forholdet, men 
at Forholdet forholder sig til sig selv. Mennesket er en Synthese af Uende­
lighed og Endelighed, af det Timelige og det Evige ,af Frihed og Nødven­
dighed, kort en Synthese. En Synthese er et Forhold mellem To. Saaledes 
betragtet er Mennesket endnu intet Selv.
I Forholdet mellem To er Forholdet det Tredie som negativ Eenhed, og 
de To forholde sig til Forholdet, og i Forholdet til Forholdet; saaledes er 
under Bestemmelsen Sjel Forholdet mellem Sjel og Legeme et Forhold. 
Forholder derimod Forholdet sig til sig selv, saa er dette Forhold det 
positive Tredie, og dette er Selvet. (XI, 127)1 
In this passage Kierkegaard first defines man as “spirit” (Aand), and then
1 Quotations from Kierkegaard’s works are from Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Vcerker, 
1st Udg., edd. A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, og H. O. Lange, København: Gylden­
dalske Boghandel, 1905.
proceeds to identify spirit with »the self« (Selvet). Furthermore, he argues that 
man is a synthesis. He offers several different formulations of the elements 
of this synthesis: infinite (Uendelighed) and finite (Endelighed), temporal 
(Timelige) and eternal (Evige), freedom (Frihed) and necessity (Nødvendig­
hed), body (Legeme) and soul (Sjel).2 In another context Kierkegaard 
contends that the spirit, or the self, is the means by which the synthesis of 
these different components is achieved.
Men en Synthèse er utænkelig, naar de Tvende ikke enes i Tredie. Dette 
Tredie er Aanden. (IV, 315)
In these texts, we have the basic factors involved in Kierkegaard’s notion of 
the structure of selfhood.. If confusion is to be avoided, some terminological 
clarification is necessary at the outset of our investigation. As will become 
more evident, in the passages with which we are concerned, Kierkegaard 
employs the term “self” in a more restricted way than it is usually used. 
Rather than referring to the overall personality, “self” is used to designate 
one component of the personality. For this reason, when discussing Kierke­
gaards argument, it will be helpful to use the term “self system” to designate 
the total strucure of he personality. The word “self” will be reserved for the 
more narrow use which Kierkegaard follows. A second clarification concerns 
one of the sets of terms mentioned above. It has been seen that one way in 
which Kierkegaard indicates the elements of the synthesis is “freedom and 
necessity.” This way of stating the polarity is, however, misleading. If it is 
maintained, insuperable obstacles develop. The polarity is better expressed 
by the terms “possibility” (Mulighed) and “necessity” (Nødvendighed). This 
is actually in keeping with Kierkegaard’s meaning, for when he elaborates 
this distinction, he uses the terms “possibility” and “necessity.”
From these initial comments it is clear that Kierkegaard designates two 
aspects of the self system. The first he calls spirit or the self. The second he 
indicates by various expressions of the elements in a synthesis. In addition to 
this, the two aspects are closely related, for it is through the spirit (self) that 
the synthesis of the different components is accomplished. To begin to under­
stand the way in which these various aspects of the self system are related, it
2 "Sjel” is a very difficult word to render accurately in English. “Soul" is used as the 
translation. This should not, however, imply strictly religious connotations, though these 
are involved. The word refers more to the essential psychic and mental aspects of the 
individual's personality. This broader meaning of Sjel must be kept in mind if the 
following argument is to be comprehensible.
is necessary to try to distinguish the different expressions of the synthesis 
which Kierkegaard presents. Upon investigation, it becomes apparent that the 
four forumlations of the elements of the synthesis are not equivalent. A basic 
distinction must be made between the synthesis as expressed by the categories 
temporal/eternal, and the synthesis as expressed by the categories infinite/ 
finite, possibility/necessity, and soul/body. In this context, each of the last 
three sets of terms is the junctional equivalent of the other two. They all 
endeavor to explore the same dimension of selfhood. From the foregoing 
designation of the elements of the self system, the distinction between the 
synthesis expressed in terms of temporality and necessity and the other three 
formulations is not, however, readily apparent.
We can see the manner in which Kierkegaard establishes this distinction by 
recalling that spirit is the necessary third through which the other components 
of the self system are synthesized. Kierkegaard goes on to identify the spirit 
(self) with the eternal.
Synthesen af det Sjelelige og det Legemlige skal sættes af Aand, men 
Aanden er det Evige, og er først derfor, naar Aanden sætte den første 
Synthese tilllige som den anden Synthese af det Timelige og det Evige. 
(IV, 360-361)
At this juncture an apparent problem emerges. Spirit was said to be the 
synthesizing agent for the different components of the synthesis. Now Kierke­
gaard identifies spirit with one of the elements to be synthesized -  with the 
eternal. It would seem impossible for spirit (the self, or the eternal) to be both 
the synthesizing agent and that which is synthesized. This impression is 
supported when it is recognized that Kierkegaard thinks that two things can 
only be synthesized through a third. Spirit had been indicated to be the third 
through which the synthesis takes place. However, when spirit is identified 
with one of the elements to be synthesized, the third necessary for the process 
of synthesis would seem to have disappeared.
The problem encountered here can be resolved by clearly distinguished the 
expression of the synthesis within the self’s structure in terms of temporality 
and eternity from the other expressions. The following text is illuminating 
in this connection.
Mennesket var altsaa en Synthese af Sjel og Legeme, men er tillige en 
Synthese af det Timelige og det Evige. .. .  Hvad den sidste Synthese angaaer, 
da er det strax paafaldende, at den er dannet anderledes end den første. I
den første var Sjel og Legeme Synthesens tvende Momenter, og Aanden 
det Tredie, dog saaledes, at der først egentlig var Tale om Synthesen idet 
Aanden sattes. Den anden Synthese har kun to Momenter: det Timelige 
og det Evige. (IV, 355)
This distinction should not, however, be thought to define two different and 
separate syntheses. All four sets of terms taken together define one complex 
synthesis which is the human self system.
Synthesen af det Timelige og det Evige er ikke en anden Synthese, men 
Udtrykket for hiin første Synthese, ifølge hvilken Mennesket er en Synthese 
af Sjel og Legeme, der bæres af Aand. (IV, 358)
What the recognition of the distinction noted here does establish is that it is 
by virtue of the fact that man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal 
that he can be regarded as a synthesis of soul and body, of the infinite and the 
finite, and of possibility and necessity.
Yet the various expressions of the synthesis are even more complexly 
related. The three pairs of terms which are different expressions for the same 
aspect of selfhood (infinitude/finitude, possibility/necessity, and soul/body) 
are efforts to define one of the elements of the other pair of terms -  tem­
porality. It must be stressed that with respect to the self, no sharp separation 
of temporal and eternal is possible on Kierkegaard’s terms. They are 
dialectically related. A deeper comprehension of Kierkegaard’s analysis of the 
structure of selfhood can only be achieved by investigating the meaning of 
“temporal” and of “eternal” with reference to the self system.
Arriving at a satisfactory understanding of Kierkegaard’s meaning of 
“temporal” and “eternal” is most difficult due to his idiosyncratic use of the 
philosophical tradition. This is especially evident in the case of the term 
“eternal.” Despite the bewildering variety of ways in which Kierkegaard uses 
the word “eternal”, a formal consistency can be discerned. “Eternal” always 
refers to: unchangeability and possibility. Although these two meanings are 
interrelated, in this context we must focus on the aspect of unchangeability. 
When eternity is understood to involve unchangeability, it is usually set in 
polar tension with temporality. Temporality, as distinguished from eternity, 
is the realm of change, the realm of becoming. The eternal, in contradistinction 
from the temporal is that which is, and does not become. The eternal is the 
unchanging as opposed to the changing. Another way of expressing the fact 
that the eternal is the unchangeable and the temporal is the changeable would
be to argue that the eternal is that which is self-identical, while the temporal 
by its very nature, lacks self-identity. The distinctions which Kierkegaard is 
making by his various uses of these terms, of course, date back to the Greeks, 
and it is within this context that he develops his views.
These definitions of “temporär’ of “eternal” seem to raise further difficulties 
for Kierkegaard’s view of selfhood. He argues that the self is a synthesis of the 
temporal and the eternal. However by “temporal” he means changeability 
(becoming) and by “eternal” he means unchangeability (being). This would 
seem to lead to the apparently self-contradictory conclusion that the self 
system is both changeable and unchangeable. Kierkegaard insists that precisely 
such a paradoxical conception of the self system is both correct and necessary. 
Being and becoming, or unchangeabality and changeabality, are dialectically 
related; each presupposes the other. Therefore, when Kierkegaard states that 
man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, he is arguing that the 
individual is a synthesis of being and becoming, or of unchangeability and 
changeability. Furthermore, because the eternal element in the self system is 
self-identical, it provides the factor of continuity without which the self system 
wrould be immersed in ceaseless flux.
When Kierkegaard contends that man is a synthesis of the temporal (the 
changing) and the eternal (the unchanging), he is using language which had 
a long history in philosophical reflection, but his meaning is not the same as 
much of that tradition. Further specification of what Kierkegaard means by 
“a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal” is, therefore, required. In an 
effort to clarify Kierkegaard’s argument, it will be helpful to look at the 
historical context in which he develops his thoughts.
2. The Historical Context
The way in which the problem that Kierkegaard’s foregoing reflections 
address was formulated in the history of philosophy might be stated as the 
problem of the one and the many with respect to the self. How can one 
assert the unity of the self while at the same time acknowledging that the 
self constantly experiences changing states? To put it explicitly in Kierke­
gaard’s terms, what sense does it make to argue that the self is both changing 
and unchanging?
Throughout the course of philosophical reflection, a common way of
resolving this problem was to argue that the self is a substance in which 
accidents inhere. Substance was taken to be that which exists in and through 
itself, or what which does not depend on anything else for its existence. 
Accidents are that which exist in and through something else, or that which 
depend on something else for existence. Because substance is that which is 
self-identical, and which underlies accidents, it is regarded at that which holds 
together the otherwise disparate experiences or changing states of the self.
The parallels of this way of presenting the problem of the unity and the 
diversity of the self, or of explaining the fact that the same self has different 
experiences (i. e., that the self is both unchanging and changing) with Kierke­
gaard's argument should be evident. Substance, as Kierkegaard's eternal, is 
that which does not change. Attribute, as Kierkegaard's temporal, is that which 
changes. It is, furthermore, substance, as Kierkegaard's eternal, which is the 
factor of continuity in the otherwise changing self.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the view of the 
self as substance underwent a critical réévaluation. On the one hand, the 
notion of substance was extended from individual selves to the whole of 
being until everything became a mode of the single substance. On the other 
hand, the conception of substance was critized as a figment of the imagination, 
and was completely dismissed. It is not possible to develop these trends of 
thought in detail in the present context. We must limit our comments to a 
brief statement of these two tendencies as the bakground for Hegel’s 
consideration of the problem. It is on Hegel's analysis that Kierkegaard's 
argument depends.
It was Spinoza who extended the notion of substance to include all being 
within a single substance. This move, however, was implicit in the 
traditional view of substance. It has been seen that substance was defined 
as that which exists in and through itself. According to this definition, 
substance would be that which is self-sufficient. But it is usually thought 
that God alone is self-sufficient, while all of creation is dependent on God. 
Recognizing these implications of the conception of substance, Spinoza argued 
for a monism in which the single substance was regarded as God, and all 
else was seen as a mode of the self-sufficient substance, God.
The opposite extreme is expressed by the British Empiricists. In the works 
of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume the notion of the self as substance is criticized. 
It was primarily the empirical epistemology which formed the basis of their
criticism of the conception of substance. The idea of substance was regarded 
as imaginatively constructed and was not thought to derive from sense im­
pressions. Because Hume, and his tradition, accepted empirical verification 
as the criterion of truth, they denied that substance was a true idea. With 
respect to the self, the denial of substance meant the denial of the unity of the 
self. It was argued that there is no underlying substance in which accidents 
inhere, for the self is nothing than the sum of its accidents or a “bundle of 
sensations.”
The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make 
their appearance, pass, repass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety 
of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, 
nor identity in different times.3
The self is a ceaseless flux of sensations with neither unity at one time, nor 
continuity through time. Any unity predicated of the self is an imaginative 
illusion which is not rooted in experience.
Therefore, from one point of view it was argued that all selves are modes 
of the single substance, God, and from another point of view that selves are 
bundles of disunited sensations. Hegel finds both of these alternatives un- 
accptable. He tries to resolve the problem by reworking the idea of substance 
in terms of the idea of subject.
In the preface to his Phänomenologie Des Geistes, Hegel comments:
Es kommt nach meiner Einsicht, welche sich nur durch die Darstellung des 
Systems selbst rechtfertigen muss, alles darauf an, das Wohre nicht als Sub­
stanz, sondern eben so sehr als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrücken. (19)4 
In this text one can see Hegel’s dissatisfaction with the metaphysical positions 
in the history of philosophy which drew on the Greek ideas of substance and 
accident. In place of these categories, which were drawn from the natural 
sciences, Hegel proposes to interpret reality in terms of social metaphors. He 
conceives one of his principle philosophical advances to be the replacement 
of the category of substance with the category of subject. Although many of 
Hegel’s arguments are directed to reality as a whole, and not only to individuals 
which make up that totality, his insights likewise apply to individual selves.
3 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (London: John Noon, 1739), p. 439-
4 Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from Hegel’s work are from Phänomenologie des 
Geistes, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952). The page number 
is cited parenthetically.
This fact is important to recognize, for much of Kierkegaard’s argument with 
respect to the self can be regarded as the application of Hegel’s comments 
about the Absolute Self to individual selves. For this reason, we will consider 
Hegel’s argument in connection with individual selves.
Hegel directly attacks the understanding of subject5 in terms of substance 
and attribute as it has been presented above when he writes:
Das Subjekt ist als fester Punkt angenommen, an den als ihren Halt die 
Prädikate geheftet sind, durch eine Bewegung, die dem von ihm Wissenden 
angehört und die auch nicht dafür angesehen wird, dem Punkt selbst anzu­
gehören; durch sie aber wäre allein der Inhalt als Subjekt dargestellt. In 
der Art, wie diese Bewegung beschaffen ist, kann sie ihm nicht angehören; 
aber nach Voraussetzung jenes Punkts kann sie auch nicht anders beschaf­
fen, kann sie nur äusserlich sein. Jene Antizipation, dass das Absolute 
Subjekt ist, ist daher nicht nur nicht die Wirchlichkeit dieses Begriffs, son­
dern macht sie sogar unmöglich; denn jene setzt ihn als ruhenden Punkt, 
diese aber sie die Selbstbewegung. (23)
According to Hegel, when the subject is viewed as a substance, it is seen at 
a static substratum to which predicates are externally related. Hegel argues that 
this erroneous conception of the subject or of the self is derived, in part, from 
the grammar of statements that refer to the self in which the subject is linked 
to a predicate by the copula “is”. From this emerges the notion that the subject 
is something independent of its descriptive predicates, or, as Hegel puts it:
... das Selbst ist, in das der Inhalt zurückgeht, so ist dagegen in seinem 
positiven Erkennen das Selbst ein vorgestelltes Subjekt, worauf sich der 
Inhalt als Akzidens und Prädikat bezieht. (49)
Because Hegel thinks that the very structure of grammar encourages this mis­
understanding of the nature of the subject, he holds that
... die Natur der Urteils oder Satzes überhaupt, die den Unterschied des 
Subjekts und Prädikats in sich schliesst, durch den spekulativen Satz zerstört 
wird ... (50)
The subject does not exist independently of the predicates, but the predicates 
themselves fully express the subject.
Vom Subjekte anfangend, als ob dieses zum Grunde liegen bliebe, findet
5 As is perhaps evident, “subject’' and “self” can be used interchangeably when discussing 
Hegel’s argument. Support for this is given by the fact that Hegel himself so uses the 
erms (subject -  Subjekt, and self -Selbst).
es, indem das Prädikat vielmehr die Substanz ist, das Subjekt zum Prädikat 
übergegangen und hiemit aufgehoben ... (50)
The denial of the actuality of a subject or substance independent of attributes 
or predicates sounds very similar to the position of the British Empiricists 
which was noted above. While Hegel agrees with the empiricists insofar as 
they offered a criticism of the empty notion of substance, he does not think 
that they have presented an adequate analysis of the self. By denying the 
substance aspect of the self while affirming the attributes, they remainded 
within a generally substantialistic conception of the structure of selfhood. 
Hegel seeks to give a more adequate analysis of the self than his predecessors 
had been able to develop.
In trying to present a satisfactory view of selfhood, Hegel consistently 
regards the self in the dynamic terms of purposive activity. In the following 
quotation he gives one of his most concise definitions of the self. The text is 
particularly important because it is remarkably similar to Kierkegard’s 
definition of the self which was cited above (p. 84).
Das Resultat ist nur darum dasselbe, was der Anfang, weil der Anfang 
Zweck ist; -  oder das Wirkliche ist nur dasselbe, was sein Begriff, weil das 
Unmittelbare als Zweck das Selbst oder die reine Wirklichkeit in ihm selbst 
hat. Der ausgeführte Zweck oder das daseiende Wirkliche ist Bewegung 
und entfaltetes Werden; eben diese Unruhe aber ist das Selbst; und jener 
Unmittelbarkeit und Einfachheit des Anfangs ist es darum gleich, weil es 
das Resultat, das in sich Zurückgekehrte, -  das in sich Zurückgekehrte aber 
eben das Selbst, und das Selbst die sich auf sich beziehende Gleichheit und 
Einfachheit ist. (22)
The actuality of the self is the function of “executed purpose” {ausgeführte 
Zweck), which develops through “unfolded becoming” {entfaltetes Werden). 
Hegel argues that the unrest (Unruhe), the activity, the movement by which 
purpose is executed is the self. Mediation is the name of the process by which 
the self actualizes itself.
Denn die Vermittlung ist nichts anders als die sich bewegende Sichselbst- 
gleichheit, oder sie ist die Reflexion in sich selbst, das Moment des fürsich- 
seienden Ich, die reine Negativität oder, auf ihre reine Abstraktion herab­
gesetzt, das einfache Werden. (21)
That is to say, the self becomes objective to itself in the form of a purpose 
to be carried out, or a goal to be achieved. The self is that which it intends to
become through its purposive activity, but initially it is that self in an 
immediate form. Hegel uses the term “an sich“ to indicate this stage in the 
process of self-development. To put his point in other language, the self is 
potentially the self which it intends to be. However before the self actually 
is the self which it is now only potentially, the immediate must be mediated, 
the possible must be actualized. The self must strive to realize the potentialities 
which have been envisioned. The stage at which potentialities are realized is 
called by Hegel “für sich!' The self first posits the ideal self as objective 
to, and distinguished from the real self. One then strives to actualize the 
potentiality imagined in this ideal self. When, after having realized the 
conceived possibilities, one comes to a clear understanding of his self as the 
actualization of his potentialities, the self can be said to exist in-and-for-itself.
These insights enable us to understand more fully Hegel's definition of the 
self which was cited on the foregoing page. Through establishing goals for 
itself, the self establishes an opposition within itself in the form of a 
distinction between the ideal self and the real self. In setting a purpose, or in 
envisioning an ideal self, one passes away from his actual self. In the realization 
of the ideal, one returns to his self. This movement by which the ideal self is 
actualized, or by which purposes are executed, is the activity in which the self 
“relates itself [its ideal self] to itself [its real self].” The self, properly so-called, 
is this process of self-relation. To put it briefly, the self is the active process 
by which possibilities are actualized.
Die lebendige Substanz ist ferner das Sein, welches in Wahrheit Subjekt, 
oder was dasselbe heisst, welches in Wahrheit wirklich ist, nur insofern sie 
die Bewegung des Sichselbstsetzens, oder die Vermittlung des Sichanders- 
werdens mit sich selbst ist. Sie ist als Subjekt die reine einfache Negativität, 
ebendadurch die Entzweiung des Einfachen; oder die entgegensetzende 
Verdopplung, welche wieder die Negation dieser gleichgültigen Ver­
schiedenheit und ihres Gegensatzes ist: nur diese sich wieder her st eilende 
Gleichheit oder die Reflexion im Anderssein in sich selbst -  nicht eine 
ursprüngliche Einheit als solche, oder unmittelbare als solche -  ist das 
Wahre. Es ist das Werden seiner selbst, der Kreis, der sein Ende als seinen 
Zweck voraussetzt und zum Anfänge hat und nur durch die Ausführung 
und sein Ende wirklich ist. (20)
A further aspect of Hegel’s analysis of selfhood needs to be examined, for 
again there are marked parallels with Kierkegaard’s view. This concerns the
manner in which possibilities are realized. For Kierkegaard the will, motivated 
by interest is the means by which possibilities are actualized. Hegel's view is 
remarkably similar.
Zweck, Grundsätze, u. s. s. sind in unser Gedanken, erst in unser inneren 
Absicht, aber noch nicht in der Wirklichkeit. Was an sich ist, ist eine 
Möglichkeit, ein Vermögen, aber noch nicht aus seinem Inneren zur Exi­
stenz gekommen. Es muss ein zweites Moment für ihre Wirklichkeit hin- 
zukommen und diess ist die Bethätigung, Verwirklichung, und deren Prin- 
cip ist der Wille, die Thätigkeit des Menschen überhaupt. Es ist nur durch 
diese Thätigkeit dass jener Begriff sowie die an sich seyenden Bestimmung 
realisirt, verwirklicht werden, denn sie gelten nicht unmittelbar durch sich 
selbst. Die Thätigkeit, welche sie ins Werk und Daseyn setzt ist des Men­
schen Bedürfnis, Trieb, Neigung, und Leidenschaft.6 
Furthermore, the will, moved to actualize certain potentialities through 
interest or passion, is constitutive of one’s personality. In a statement which is 
contrary to the mood of the Speculative Philosopher who has forgotten the 
existing individual, Hegel writes:
Dieser particulare Inhalt ist so Eins mit dem Willen des Menschen, dass 
er die ganze Bestimmtheit dasselben ausmacht und untrennbar von ihm ist 
er ist dadurch das, was er ist. Denn dass Individuum ist ein solches, das da 
ist, nicht Mensch überhaupt, denn der existirt nicht, sondern ein be­
stimmter.7
Thus according to Hegel, the self is that purposive activity by which 
possibilities are actualized. It is the self-relating activity in which the real self 
is related to the ideal self. As the ideal self is realized, the real self is negated. 
This constant unrest, this incessant striving is the self. The motor of this 
process is the will, and the will is driven by desire or by interest. Only in such 
dynamic and developmental terms does Hegel think that selfhood, and in the 
final analysis the whole of reality, can be understood. With these insights 
concerning the historical context in which Kierkegaard develops his conception 
of the structure of selfhood, and most particularly with an understanding of 
the manner in which Hegel reconstructs what had been the traditional ways
6 Hegel, Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Sämtliche Werke, (Stuttgart: 
Fr. Frommann, 1961), vol. XI, p. 50.
7 Ibid., p. 52.
of construing the self, we are prepared to return to Kierkegaard’s own 
argument.
3. Kierkegaard’s Analysis
We can begin where we left off in the first section -  by further clarifying 
the “temporal/eternal” polarity. We have seen that, in general terms, eternity 
refers to that component of the self system which does not change, while 
temporality refers to that aspect of the self system which is constantly changing, 
or perpetually becoming. From our previous analysis, it has become apparent 
that Kierkegaard equates spirit both with the self and with the eternal in man. 
Moreover, the self, the eternal, or spirit is “that in the relation which relates 
itself to its own self.” As should be apparent by now, Kierkegaard views the 
self system as a complex set of relationships. The self is that in the system 
which accomplishes these relationships. In full agreement with Hegel, Kierke­
gaard is intent on stressing that the self is not a static entity (as the sub- 
stantialistic notions of selfhood imply), but is a dynamic activity. For this 
reason, he contends:
... Selvet er ikke Forholdet, men at Forholdet forholder sig til sig selv. 
(XI, 127)
The self is the dynamic activity of relating itself to its own self. It should 
be clear that this line of argument is directly parallel to that of Hegel as 
it has been developed in the previous section. There we saw that Hegel 
concludes that
... das in sich Zuriickgekehrte aber eben das Selbst, und das Selbst die sich
auf sich besiehende Gleichheit und Einfachheit ist. (22)
We must try to grasp more completely what Kierkegaard means by this 
confusing language of an activity which “relates itself to its own self.”
We have seen that in the text in which Kierkegaard defines the self system 
he offers three sets of terms other than temporal/eternal to designate the 
components to be synthesized by the self. These are: infinitude/finitude, 
possibility/necessity,8 and soul/body. It is important to note, however, that
8 It should be pointed out that in the texts in which Kierkegaard develops his views on 
this problematic, he uses necessity (Nødvendighed) and actuality (Virkelighed) inter­
changeably. Our use of the terms follows that of Kierkegaard.
within the context of the initial definition of the self system, Kierkegaard does 
not include soul/body. This set of terms is added in the second paragraph. 
Although he tends to use soul/body more frequently in other contexts, most 
notably in The Concept of Dread, it is clear that in this context Kierkegaards 
primary focus is on infinite/finite and possibility/necessity. This is underscored 
by the fact that when Kierkegaard turns to a detailed consideration of the 
various polarities, soul/body is eliminated. For this reason, we will restrict our 
analysis to the statement of the polarity in terms of infinite/finite and 
possibility/necessity. Because of the close relationship among the three ex­
pressions, no misunderstanding of Kierkegaard’s intention results from such 
a restriction.
Both infinite/finite and possibility/necessity refer to the fact that man is 
conditioned by his historical situation and free to act within the limits of this 
situation. Man is free and determined, but is neither fully free nor fully deter­
mined. The terms “finitude” and “necessity” refer to the fact of man’s 
determination, and the terms “infinitude” and “possibility” refer to man’s 
capacity to act. According to Kierkegaard’s analysis, human selfhood always 
includes these two components which stand in polar tension. One always finds 
himself historically situated in a certain place and at a certain time. This 
situation conditions the possibilities which are open to the individual. One’s 
historical epoch, spatial location, parents, natural abilities, etc. are all ele­
ments of his being which affect what the individual can do. It is never the 
case for Kierkegaard, at it was for some of his Existentialist followers, that 
man has a radical freedom which is unconditioned by his situation and by his 
past. Kierkegaard never holds that man has liberum arbitrium.
Infinitude and finitude and possibility and necessity are always dialectically 
related in concrete human existence.
Selvet er den bevidste Synthèse af Uendelighed og Endelighed, der forholder 
sig til sig selv, hvis Opgave er at vorde sig selv, hvilket kun lader sig g)0re 
ved Forholdet til Gud. Men at vorde sig selv er at vorde concret. Men at 
vorde concret er hverken at blive endelig eller at blive uendelig, thi det 
der skal vorde concret er jo en Synthèse. Udviklingen maa altsaa bestaae 
i uendeligt at komme bort fra sig selv i Uendeliggj0relse af Selvet, og i 
uendeligt at komme tilbage til sig selv i Endeliggj0relsen. (XI, 143) 
“Finitude” designates the temporally situated and determined aspect of the 
self system (i. e., the self’s actuality). It is that which is necessary, or which is
given to the self, and from which the self must necessarily proceed in any 
further development. “Infinitude” indicates the capability of the individual so 
situated to imagine various alternative courses of action. It is the capacity of 
the historically determined individual to entertain different possibilities. That 
infinite/finite and possibility/necessity are parallel terms which refer to the 
same dimension of human experience is indicated by Kierkegaard’s analysis 
of the latter expression.
Ligesom Endelighed er det Begrændsende i Forhold til Uendelighed, saa- 
ledes er Nødvendighed i Forhold til Mulighed Det, der holder igjen. Idet 
Selvet, som Synthese af Endelighed og Uendelighed, er sat, er xaxa dvvafliv, 
for nu at vorde, reflekterer det sig i Phantasiens Medium, og derved viser 
den uendelige Mulighed sig. Selvet er xara åvvapuv lige saa meget muligt 
som nødvendigt; thi det er jo sig selv, men det skal vorde sig selv. Forsaa- 
vidt det er sig selv, er det Nødvendigt, og forsaavidt det skal vorde sig selv, 
er det en Mulighed. (XI, 148)
The reference to the imagination (Phantasie) raises an important point in 
this context. Imagination is, for Kierkegaard, the capacity by which an individual 
recognizes his infinitude, or envisions his possibilities. In the following passage, 
Kierkegaard indicates this function of the imagination in a way which parallels 
Hegel’s views discussed above.
Ethvert Menneske har i høiere eller ringere Grad en Evne, som kaldes 
Indbildningskraften,9 den Kraft, der er den første Betingelse for hvad der 
bliver af et Menneske; thi Villen er den anden og i sidste Forstand afgjø- 
rende. Hukommelsen er stærkest i Barndommen, og tager saa af med 
Aarene; Indbildningskraften er stærkest i Ynglingsalderen, og tager saa af 
med Aarene. Vi ville nu tænke os en Yngling; med sin Indbildningskraft 
opfatter han et eller andet Fuldkommenhedens Billede (Ideal), det være nu 
et historisk overleveret, altsaa fra en forbigangen Tid, saa det altsaa har 
været virkeligt, har havt Værens Virkelighed, eller det dannes af Indbild­
ningskraften selv, saa det altsaa ikke har Forhold til eller Bestemmelse af 
Tid og Sted, men kun Tanke-Virkelighed. Til dette Billede (der, da det for 
Ynglingen kun er til inden for Indbildningen, det er, indenfor Indbildnin­
gens uendelige Fjernhed fra Virkelighed, er den fuldendte Fuldkommen­
heds) drages nu Ynglingen ved sin Indbildningskraft, eller hans Indbild-
9 "Imagination” is the translation for both Phmtasie and Indbildningskraften. Kierkegaard 
uses these two words interchangeably.
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ningskraft drager ham dette Billede til sig; han forelsker sig i dette Billede, 
eller dette Billede bliver hans Kjerlighed, hans Begeistring, ham hans 
fuldkomnere (idealere) Selv... (XII, 173)
By means of the imagination, the individual is able to construct an ideal self 
which is distinguished from his real or actual self. The ideal self presents to 
him his possibility (his infinitude), and the real self confronts him with his 
necessity (his finitude or actuality). These two aspects of the individual’s self 
system are dialectically related, for the real conditions the ideal, and the ideal 
conditions real. Having posited an ideal self, one endeavors to actualize the 
potentialities there imagined. This is the identical process to which Hegel points 
in the argument which we have already considered. Furthermore, it was seen 
that Hegel identifies the self, properly so-called, with the active interrela­
tionship of the real and the ideal selves.
We are now in a position to see that Kierkegaard makes the same 
identification. It has been noted that he argues that “the self is a relation which 
relates itself to its own self.” This can now be understood to mean that “the 
self is a relation which relates itself [its ideal self, its potentially, its infinitude] 
to its own self [its real self, its necessity, its finitude]. For Kierkegaard, as for 
Hegel, the unrest, the striving, in which the real self is negated by the effort 
to actualize the ideal self is the self. Put briefly, the self is the dynamic process 
by which potentialities are actualized; the self is purposive activity .
However, as is well known, one of the main points in Kierkegaard’s 
argument is that the self develops through its own free decisions. That is to 
say, the self actualizes its possibilities through its freedom. It is for this reason 
that Kierkegaard makes the final move of identifying the self with freedom. 
Selvet er dannet af Uendelighed og Endelighed. Men denne Synthese er et 
Forhold, og et Forhold, der, om end deriveret, forholder sig til sig selv, 
hvilket er Frihed. Selvet er Frihed. Men Frihed er det Dialektiske i Bestem­
melserne Mulighed og Nødvendighed. (XI, 142)
It must, of course, be kept in mind that the freedom here in question is not an 
absolute freedom. It is always rielated to, and conditioned by, the actuatity of 
the individual’s situation in existence.
The careful reader should have noticed that with the equation of the self 
with freedom we have added another (and the final) term to the several 
equivalent categories which we have previously discussed. At the outset it was 
seen that Kierkegaard first identifies the self with spirit, and then proceeds
to equate the self with the eternal element in the self system. Now it becomes 
apparent that the self is also identified with freedom. That is to say, there are 
four terms which Kierkegaard uses to try to designate that part of the self 
system which is under investigation: spirit, eternal, freedom, and self. In a 
previous context we have noted that one of the fundamental meanings of 
“eternal” for Kierkegaard is that which is unchangeable, while one of the 
basic characteristics of the “temporal” is its changeability. We are now able 
to specify these terms further. The eternal component of the self system is 
nothing other than the self itself. The self is freedom. To put it another way, 
that which does not change within the self system is the fact of the self’s 
freedom. It is the constant capacity of the self to relate itself (its ideal self, its 
possibilities, its infinitude) to itself (its real self, its necessity, its finitude). The 
eternal element of the self does not refer to an unchanging substratum or to 
a static substance, but designates the unchanging capacity of the self to act, 
to strive to actualize possibilities.
Temporality, as has been seen above, is characterized by its changeability; 
it is the realm of becoming. Becoming, however, arises from the interrela­
tionship between possibility and actuality, or necessity. In a manner similar 
to Hegel, Kierkegaard argues that this interrelationship is the result of the 
exercise of the will. That is to say, it is the result of the activity which he 
calls the self. It is for this reason that spirit, or the self, is the synthesizing 
agent for the various components of the self system. The self is the necessary 
third which synthesizes possibility and necessity, infinitude and finitude, the 
ideal and the real selves.
When it is claimed that “temporality” refers to those aspects of the self 
system which constantly change, the intention is to stress that the possibilities 
of the self are always changing as one continues to exist. These changes are 
conditioned by the changes in the actuality or the necessity of the self. Such 
changes can be accomplished either by actions of others upon the self, or by 
the self’s own actions. Although the contrete necessity and possibility of the 
self constantly change, what does not change is the fact that the self its free 
to act in each and every situation. The particular course of action open to the 
individual will not be the same, but the fact of one’s freedom, and hence the 
capacity to take some course of action, is the unchanging factor in the self 
system. It is in this sense that Kierkegaard’s claim that the self is both 
temporal and eternal, both changing and unchanging is to be understood.
Although we have made considerable progress in untangling Kierkegaard’s 
complex notion of the structure of selfhood, at major problem remains. We 
have seen that for Kierkegaard a synthesis between two elements must always 
be accomplished through a third. For the polarities of infinitude/finitude, 
possibility/necessity, and soul/body the self (spirit, the eternal, or fredom) 
has been seen to be the synthesizing agent. But the self cannot be the means 
by which the temporal and the eternal components of the self system are 
synthesized, for Kierkegaard identifies the self with one of these two 
components (the eternal). Kierkegaard himself is aware of this dilemma. A 
more complete consideration of a text earlier cited makes this evident.
Hvad den sidste Synthèse angaaer, da er det strax paafaldende, at den er 
dannet anderledes end den første. I den første var Sjel og Legeme Synthe- 
sens tvende Momenter, og Aanden det Tredie, dog saaledes, at der først 
egentlig var Tale om Synthesen idet Aanden sattes. Den anden Synthèse 
har kun to Momenter: det Timelige og det Evige. Hvor er her det Tredie? 
Og er der intet Tredie, da er der egentligen ingen Synthèse, thi en Synthèse, 
som er en Modsigelse, kan ikke fuldkommes som Synthèse uden i et Tredie; 
thi det, at Synthesen er en Modsigelse, udsiger jo netop, at den ikke er. 
(IV, 355)
Kierkegaard solves this problem by the use of the category Øieblikket -  the 
moment or the instant. In this context, the moment refers to the situation in 
which the individual is confronted with a choice -  it is the moment of decision. 
In the moment one faces his possibilities in full recognition of his necessity 
(his actuality) and with a complete awareness of his freedom (limited though 
it be) to actualize possibilities.
Øieblikket er hiint Tvetydige, hvori Tiden og Evigheden berøre hinanden, 
og hermed er Begrebet Timelighed sat, hvor Tiden bestandig afskærer 
Evigheden og Evigheden bestandig gjennemtrænger Tiden. Først nu faaer 
hiin omtalte Inddeling sin Betydning: den nærværende Tid, den forbi­
gangne Tid, den tilkommende Tid. (IV, 359)
The decision which one makes constitutes a further definition of one's actuality. 
As we have seen, there are aspects of one’s being which are given and which 
are not a function of the individual’s own choice. These elements Kierkegaard 
calls one’s actuality. But a person’s actuality is also constituted by his own 
decisions. On the basis of one’s given actuality, he strives to realize those 
possibilities which are commensurate with his actuality. The realization of
these possibilities, however, further defines one’s actuality, and correlatively 
conditions one’s possibilities. Kierkegaard’s contention in the foregoing 
quotation that the moment posits the temporal is, in the final analysis, only 
another way of making this same point. It is the present moment of decision 
which decisively distinguishes one’s future (his possibilities) from one’s past 
(his actuality). In the present one must decide about his future, and thereby 
constitute his past. In other words, through the exercise of the will in the 
freedom of decision one realizes his possibilities and by so doing further 
defines his actuality. What Kierkegaard perceives is that the structure of 
selfhood and the modalities of time are fully interrelated.
Mark C. Taylor 
4. Conclusion
With these insights, we have reached a satisfactory understanding of Kier­
kegaard’s conception of the structure of selfhood. Because the argument has 
been long and involved, a brief symmary is in order. The following diagram 

























According to Kierkegaard, the self system consists of various elements which 
stand in tension and which must be synthesized. A fundamental expression 
for the components of the system is that the self is a synthesis of the temporal 
and the eternal. Three other expressions are given: the self is a synthesis of 
infinitude and finitude, of possibility and necessity, and of soul and body.
These three expressions are functionally equivalent and are all aimed at 
disclosing aspects of one’s temporality. That is to say, they all refer to one 
of the other expression of the synthesis -  to the temporal. The eternal factor 
within the self system is also expressed by the terms: spirit, self, and freedom. 
It is this aspect of the self system which is the synthesizing agent for the other 
components. The third factor by virtue of which the synthesis of the temporal 
and the eternal is accomplished is the moment. The moment refers to the 
instant of decision, or the moment of choice, in which the existing individual, 
conditioned by his situation and his history, is confronted with different 
possibilities which he might actualize. Through one’s present decisions, certain 
possibilities are realized, and thereby one’s actuality is further established. This 
actuality, in turn, conditions later possibilities open to the self. In this manner, 
all of the components of the self system are brought together in the moment 
of decision.
Our discussion has made it clear that in developing his conception of the 
structure of selfhood, Kierkegaard departs from the way in which much of the 
philosophical tradition had regarded the self. In constructing a more adequate 
view of selfhood, Kierkegaard draws on the insights of Hegel. In the final 
analysis, for Kierkegaard, the self must always be understood in terms of 
dynamic, purposive activity. His works present a detailed consideration of the 
structure of selfhood which underlies, and is presupposed by, human becoming. 
The fundamental task of selfhood is the effort to achive imagined goals 
through the free exercise of the will in decision. In this process, the individual 
actually defines himself within the clear limits which Kierkegaard establishes. 
The goal toward which one strives through his decisions is the accomplishment 
of an equilibrium or a balance (Ligevægt) among the different components 
of the self system. The failure to achieve this balance is what Kierkegaard 
calls despair. The successful accomplishment of the equilibrium is faith.
